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April 28

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US POSITION ON FIRST PHASE OF DISARMMENT

General

1. The following paragraphs outline provisions of first phase agreements on disarmament to be proposed by the United States.

The first phase agreements will become effective upon ratification by such states as may be agreed.

2. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the Control Organization, of either -

- a. an important violation by another party, or
- b. other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the notifying party as to require partial or complete suspension.

At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to suspend, so as to afford opportunity for correction of the violation, or prejudicial action, prior to actual suspension of obligations by the notifying party.

3. Each party will agree:

- a. To cooperate in designing, installing and maintaining effective inspection systems to verify compliance with the terms of the agreements by all parties, and
- b. That the obligations under the agreements will be conditioned on the continued effective operation of the agreed inspection system.

State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file

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I. Nuclear Provisions

1. Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense.

(NOTE: It is understood that this provision will not imply any obligation (a) to maintain non-nuclear forces for repelling non-nuclear attacks; or (b) for any specific distribution between nuclear and non-nuclear armaments.) It is also understood that this provision is not an essential part of an agreement since the UN Charter already constitutes a comparable obligation.)

2. The parties will agree:

- a. to devote all future production of fissionable materials exclusively to non-weapons purposes starting one month after the installation of an inspection system adequate to ensure that facilities for the production of fissionable materials are closed down or that the material produced in those which remain in operation is used for non-weapons purposes.
- b. to cooperate in the prompt design, installation and maintenance of the required inspection system.

(NOTE: The obligations under this provision will not affect the use, after the cut-off date, of fissionable materials on hand at that date--(1) to complete the fabrication of weapons in course of manufacture, and (2) to refabricate and maintain weapons then on hand or completed under (1).)

3. To provide for equitable transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production to internationally inspected

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non-weapon purposes, including either national or international stockpiling, the USSR, UK and US will -

- a. fix in the agreement the specific ratios of quantities of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and
- b. agree to commence such transfers in agreed quantities at the fixed ratios immediately following the cut-off date for production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Unless the Soviets insist on a 50-50 ratio, the U.S. will agree on ratios of _____ for the U.S. to _____ for the USSR, and whatever figure for the UK as may be agreed.

(NOTE: The quantities to be transferred under this first phase agreement will be such as to leave to each party affected a substantial part of its nuclear weapons capability.)

4. From the date of cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes --

- a. each party agrees not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except where their use will be in conformity with paragraph 1.
- b. each party agrees not otherwise to transfer out of its control any fissionable material, or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for non-weapon purposes. This provision will not prohibit --

- (1) any of the states possessing nuclear weapons from introducing or maintaining such weapons on the territory of a non-

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nuclear-weapons state with its consent; or

- (3) the preparatory training of forces of non-nuclear-weapons-states in the use of nuclear weapons, or equipping them with means of delivery for such weapons.

8. a. All parties will agree, independently of agreement on other provisions of section I,

- (1) to refrain, as of the effective date of the agreement from nuclear testing until 24 months thereafter. (The suspension would not continue beyond a 12 month period unless satisfactory progress was being made in the installation of the inspection system in (2) below.)
- (2) to cooperate in setting up during the 24 months period, or earlier if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests.

b. The U.S. will announce that it will refrain indefinitely from nuclear tests if the monitoring system referred to in paragraph 8a(2) is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if the inspection system for the cut-off has been installed to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if the cut-off has been put into effect.

c. The U.S. will announce that if tests are resumed, it will give notification in advance of dates and approximate yields of such tests; provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and conduct such tests underground.

d. Provision will be made for the continuation, under international auspices, of any nuclear explosions necessary for the development of peaceful application of such explosions.

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II. Inspection Against Surprise Attack

1. Upon the effective date of the agreement the parties concerned will promptly install and maintain, in an initial zone or zones specified in the agreement, an aerial and ground inspection system, including appropriate radar and communications equipment to provide safeguards against the potential of surprise attack. Details of the aerial and ground inspection system will be prescribed in an annex to the agreement.

a. The U.S.-Canada-USSR Zones

The U.S. will reaffirm its willingness to agree

- (1) That all the territory of the continental United States, all the territory of Canada and all the territory of the Soviet Union will be open to inspection, or
- (2) That all the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East longitude and north of 50 degrees North latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of the Kamchatka Peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands will be open to inspection.

b. Inspection Zone Affecting Western Europe

- (1) The U.S. will propose, subject to full consultations with the Western European nations affected, that an area including all of Europe, bounded in the south by latitude

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40 degrees North and in the west by 10 degrees West longitude and in the east by 60 degrees East longitude will be open to inspection, with or without one of the two zones described under 1.a.

- (2) The U.S. will also propose as an alternative, subject to full consultations with the West European nations affected, that a European zone extending from 5 degrees ^{EAST} West longitude to 35 degrees East longitude bounded in the south by latitude 40 degrees North will be open to inspection with or without one of the two zones described under 1.a. above.
- (3) If the Soviets should reject this proposal, the U.S. would be prepared to consider advancing a more limited European zone acceptable to the European nations affected, e.g. a zone based on the Norstad proposals, but perhaps expressed in terms of geographic coordinates.

c. Extension of Zone

If the first phase agreement does not provide for inclusion of the entire USSR in the inspection zone or zones, it may contain such provisions for subsequent expansion of the zone or zones as may be agreed in conformity with paragraphs a and b above.

2. Three months after the effective date of the agreement, the U.S., USSR and other parties concerned will provide each other with inventories of fixed

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military installations and numbers and locations of military forces and major designated armaments (including nuclear weapons delivery capabilities but excluding nuclear weapons) located within an agreed inspection zone or zones.

3. The U.S. will propose, as a measure to achieve a beginning in the opening up of the USSR and as a step toward protection against surprise attack, that ground control posts be established on an equitable and reciprocal basis at agreed installations both within the U.S. and USSR and, subject to the consent of states concerned, at foreign bases of the U.S. and USSR with or without the zones described above.

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III. Reductions of Armed Forces and Armaments

To provide for initial reductions of armed forces and armaments the following measures:

1. Within a first phase agreement which includes: (i) the US-USSR-Canada zone, (ii) a European zone, (iii) ground control posts at agreed installations, or any two of these, the US and USSR will each within one year from the effective date of the agreement:

- a. reduce its military forces to 2.2 million;
- b. deposit, in internationally supervised storage depots within its own territory, the specific quantities of designated types of major armaments of types currently operational, substantial in amount, significant in kind, and of post-World War II manufacture (or naval vessels of types in active service), to be mutually agreed upon and set forth in the agreement.

2. Within a first-phase agreement which includes the wide inspection zone covering the US-USSR-Canada and Europe, together with either the nuclear cut-off or the missile controls described in section IV paragraph 3 below and provided that comparable limitations are accepted by other militarily-significant countries, the US and USSR will each within two years of the effective date of the agreement:

- a. reduce its military forces to 2 million and exchange lists of bases and installations outside their respective territories which would be given up as a consequence of such reduction;*

* (NOTE. This proposal would be advanced only after full consultation with the UK, France, Canada, the Federal Republic and the North Atlantic Council.)

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b. deposit, in internationally supervised storage depots within its own territory, the specific quantities of designated types of armaments, substantial in amount, significant in kind, and of post-World War II manufacture (or normal vessels of types in active service), to be mutually agreed and set forth in the agreement. The amounts of armaments thus placed in storage will be such that the armaments retained will have a general agreed relationship to the armed forces remaining.

3. Parties other than the USSR and the US will make reductions of forces and deposits of armaments or accept ceilings for their forces and armaments as appropriate to specific situations, as set forth in the agreement.

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